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CASE DIGEST

This Case Digest provides brief analyses of cases that
represent current aspects of international law. The Digest
includes cases that establish legal principles and cases that apply
established legal principles to new factual situations. The cases
are grouped by topic and include references for further research.
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I. AID TO FOREIGN TRIBUNALS
DISCOVERY RULES OF THE REQUESTING STATE Do NOT LIMIT
DISCOVERY GRANTED PURSUANT TO THE ASSISTANCE TO FOREIGN
INTERNATIONAL TRIBUNALS ACT, Application of Gianoll, 3 F.3d 54 (2d

Cir. 1993), cert. denied, Foden v. Aldunate, 114 S.Ct. 443 (1993).
On May 22, 1992, the Third Civil Court of Chile
provisionally declared Ciro Gianoli Martinez, an eighty-six year
old businessman, mentally incompetent. The court appointed
Ciro's daughter and grandson, appellees in this case, to be Ciro's
provisional guardians, and ordered these guardians to prepare an
inventory of Ciro's assets. Ciro possessed substantial assets
outside Chile, including holdings in the United States controlled

by Maria Luisa de Castro Foden, the daughter of Ciro's second
wife.
1219
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On October 27, 1992, the guardians requested a discovery
order from the United States District Court for the District of
Connecticut, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1966), a statutory
provision entitled Assistance to Foreign and International
Tribunals and to Litigants Before Such Tribunals.1
The
guardians sought information about Ciro's assets from the
Fodens. The district court issued a discovery order and the
Fodens moved to vacate, arguing that the statute did not permit a
district court to order discovery unattainable under Chilean law.
The district court denied this motion. On appeal, the United
States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held: Affirmed.
Section 1782 does not require proof that discovery sought in the
United States would be available under the laws of the foreign
Jurisdiction seeking the information.
Section 1782 permits a United States district court to
order a party living within the court's Jurisdiction to provide
testimony or documents for use in a foreign tribunal. The court
noted that the statute's history and present language gave the
law broad applicability.
The Fodens argued that even broad application of Section
1782 did not allow discovery of material that would not be
discoverable in a foreign Jurisdiction. They argued that other
United -States Circuit Courts of Appeal have found such a
discoverability requirement in the statute.2 These circuits have
held that a district court cannot issue a discovery order under
this statute until the requesting party proves that the foreign
tribunal would permit the same discovery.
The Second Circuit ruled that these holdings imposed
"extra-statutory barriers" to discovery. The court noted that the
statute's plain language does not suggest that the foreign
tribunal's discovery rules determine whether the United States

court can issue a discovery order.
The court indicated that it enjoys wide discretion in
answering requests made under Section 1782. It held that a
district court may consider the foreign state's discovery rules
when deciding whether to comply with the discovery request.
Foreign discovery rules alone, however, should not dictate
whether a United States court should order discovery.
The Second Circuit further held that the district court in
this case did not abuse its discretion by granting discovery. It

1. 28 U.S.C. § 1782 (1966). This statute permits United States courts to
assist litigants before foreign and international tribunals.
2.
The appellants cited decisions from the First, Third, Eleventh, and D.C.
Circuits to support their argument.
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found the established purpose of the statute to be the promotion
of mutual cooperation between states and that the lower court
had acted in accordance with this purpose. The district court
found that, in this case, Chilean law would permit the guardians
to use any means of discovery legal in the state where discovery
was sought. Thus, the district court acted not in disregard of
Chilean law, but in furtherance of international cooperation.
Significance: In the Second Circuit, a party requesting
discovery under 28 U.S.C. § 1782 need not make an initial
showing that the same material would be discoverable under the

laws of the requesting state.

APPLICATION OF USE IMMUNITY AND FOREIGN TESTIMONIAL
PRIVILEGES

LIMITED

CRIMINAL MATTERS,

BY THE TREATY

ON

MUTUAL

ASSISTANCE

IN

In re Erato, 2 F.3d 11 (2d Cir. 1993).

In accordance with the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, 3 the Netherlands requested United States
assistance in deposing Mary Erato, an eighty-year-old resident of
Long Island, New York. John Erato, the son of Ms. Erato, was the
target of a criminal investigation in the Netherlands Antilles.
Officials in the Netherlands believed that as part of an
embezzlement scheme, Erato had transferred real estate and
other property to his mother for an amount far below actual
market value.
The Assistant United States Attorney complied with the
request and subpoenaed Ms. Erato's testimony. Ms. Erato
initially refused to testify, asserting both the Fifth Amendment
privilege against self-incrimination and the Dutch parent-child
privilege. After both the Netherlands and the United States
granted Ms. Erato use immunity, the District Court for the
Eastern District of New York ruled that she could no longer assert
these privileges. Ms. Erato continued to refuse to testify and as a
result, the district court held her in contempt. On appeal, the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit Held:
Vacated and Remanded. When prosecutors grant a witness use
immunity, the district court can compel that witness to testify,
despite the fact that the testimony is to be used in a criminal
procedure in another state. Further, the Treaty on Mutual
Assistance in Criminal Matters precludes the assertion of a
foreign parent-child privilege in the United States.

3.

Treaty on Mutual Assistance Matters, June 12, 1981. U.S.-Neth.. T.I.A.S.

No. 10.734.
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The Treaty on Mutual Assistance in Criminal Matters
permits the United States to order witnesses within the United
States to give testimony for use in a foreign criminal prosecution.
Ms. Erato argued that even witl the grant of immunity by United
States and Dutch officials, a United States court could not
compel her to testify, because her testimony would be used in a
foreign tribunal. She contended that the United States immunity
statute4 only applied to proceedings in the United States.

Although Ms. Erato's testimony was to be used in the
Netherlands, the Second Circuit reasoned that, because Dutch
officials had requested assistance from United States courts, the
testimony would be before a United States court. Therefore, for
the purposes of the immunity statute, Ms. Erato's testimony
would be given in a proceeding before a United States court.
Having received use immunity, she could no longer refuse to
testify by asserting her Fifth Amendment privilege.
In regard to the Dutch parent-child privilege, the Second
Circuit refused to recognize its effect within the United States.
The court found that the Treaty expressly eliminated recognition
of the privilege when Dutch officials sought information from
another state.
Although 28 U.S.C. § 1782 provides that a
person cannot be compelled to give testimony in violation of a
legal privilege, Section 1782 does not give force to the Dutch
parent-child privilege in this case. The Second Circuit held that
the treaty between the United States and the Netherlands
effectively limited the use of privileges in requests for assistance
under the Treaty. Thus, the court narrowed the application of
Section 1782 in situations governed by the Treaty. Because the
United States does not-recognize a parent-child pqvilege, Ms.
Erato could no longer legally refuse to testify.
The Second Circuit ultimately vacated the contempt order
because the Treaty did not clearly give Dutch officials the
authority to request Ms. Erato's testimony. The court remanded
the case for a determination of whether the Dutch officials were
the appropriate parties to invoke the Treaty.
Stgnlficance: Under the Treaty on Mutual Assistance in
Criminal Matters, a district court can compel a witness granted
immunity by the requesting state to testify, despite the fact that
only the requesting state will use the testimony. Furthermore,

4.
18 U.S.C. § 6002 (1985).
5.
Article 5 of the Treaty states that when State A is seeking evldence or
information from a witness in State B, that witness can be compelled to give
Information in accordance with the laws of State B. Any testimonial privilege that

a witness may have in the requesting state does not apply to requests under this
Article.
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the Treaty does not permit a witness in the United States to
assert a privilege that only exists in the requesting state.

I.

TRADE

No NEED TO PREPARE AN ENVIRONMENTAL IMPACT STATEMENT
FOR THE NORTH AMERICAN FREE TRADE AGREEMENT:

PROPOSING

LEGISLATION DOES NOT CONSTITUTE A FINAL AGENCY ACT, Public

Citizen v. United States Trade Representative,5 F.3d 549 (D.C. Cir.
1993), cert. denied, 114 S.Ct. 685 (1994).

Public Citizen and other environmental organizations
brought suit against the Office of the United States Trade
Representative (OTR) arguing that, according to the National
Environmental Policy Act (NEPA), the OTR needed to prepare an
environmental impact statement (EIS) for the North American
Free Trade Agreement (NAFTA). The district court held for the
plaintiffs and ordered the OTR to prepare an EIS for the proposed
treaty. On appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the D.C.
Circuit Held: Reversed. The final draft of NAFTA, however, did
not constitute a final act of a governmental agency subject to
judicial review under the Administrative Procedure Act.
Because NEPA did not create a private right of action,
Public Citizen sought judicial review of agency action pursuant to
the Administrative Procedure Act (APA). The APA permits those
adversely affected by agency action to seek judicial review of that
action. 6 The D.C. Circuit held that NAFTA, however, did not
represent a final agency action. Following the reasoning in
Franklinv. Massachusetts,7 the court found that the harm alleged
by the plaintiffs would result only if Congress enacted NAFTA.
The President, not the OTR, submits the draft treaty to Congress
for consideration. The court reasoned that the final draft of
NAFTA, however, did not constitute a final act that would harm
the plaintiffs, because the President could choose to renegotiate
portions of the treaty or could choose not to submit it to

6.

5 U.S.C. § 702 (1977).

, 112 S.Ct. 2767. In Frank&In, the plaintiffs challenged
__
u.s.
7.
the way in which the Secretary of Commerce calculated the 1990 census. After
the Secretary had tabulated the total population of the states, she reported those
numbers to the President. In turn, the President informed Congress of the
number of representatives to which each state was entitled. The Supreme Court
held that the APA did not allow judicial review of the Secretary's report, because it
was not the final act that would cause the plaintiffs alleged harm. The plaintiffs
would be harmed, if at all, by the President's report to Congress, not by the
'Secretary's report to the President. The President is not an agency; therefore, the

APA does not permit judicial review of his actions.
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Congress. As a result, only a final act of the President, not the
OTR, could cause the anticipated harm to the plaintiffs. Because
the President is not an agency, the APA does not permit judicial
review of his final actions.
The court stated that the unenforceability of the EIS
requirement in this instance did not mean that the requirement
is never enforceable. The D.C. Circuit held that the ruling of
Franklin only applied to cases in which the President is
constitutionally or statutorily responsible for the action that will
affect the parties. In the case ,of NAFTA, only the President can

submit the trade agreement to Congress.

Accordingly, the

President's involvement is essential to the trade negotiation
process. The court indicated that when the President's role is not
essential to the process, the APA
may permit judicial review of
8
otherwise final agency actions.
In a concurring opinion, Judge Randolph expressed
concern over the court's attempt to limit Franklin. He also noted
that if Congress is concerned about the environmental impact of
NAFTA, it could require an EIS before making any decision on the
treaty.
Sign~flcance:
Proposing draft legislation does not
constitute a final agency action under the APA when the
President is responsible for submitting the draft to Congress. In
accordance with the Supreme Court's ruling in Franklin, this
proposed draft legislation is not subject to judicial review.

III. TREATIES
A STATUTE REQUIRING THE SECRETARY OF STATE TO DEVELOP
TREATIES WITH OTHER STATES VIOLATES SEPARATION OF POWERS,

EarthIsland Institute v. Christopher,6 F.3d 648 (9th Cir. 1993).
Earth Island Institute, an environmental protection
organization, brought suit against the Secretary of State and the
Secretary of Commerce to enforce compliance with statutory
provisions designed to protect the sea turtle.9 The district court
dismissed the action for lack of subject matter jurisdiction. On

8.

The concurring opinion suggests that this will be the case when the

President alone is not responsible for reporting or proposing legislation to
Congress. Judicial review may be allowed when the agency itself makes the
proposal to Congress. In such a case, a final act of the agency would cause the
plaintiffs alleged harm.
9.
Sea turtles frequently drown when they are caught in nets used for
commercial shrimp trawling.
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appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Held: Affirmed. The statute constituted an embargo under the
exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International Trade. By
ordering the President to negotiate a treaty on a specific Issue,
the statute infringed upon the exclusive foreign affairs power of
the executive branch, and for the court to enforce such an order
would violate separation of powers.
Congress passed 16 U.S.C. § 1537 to encourage international protections for the sea turtle. Earth Island Institute
sought enforcement of two provisions of the statute. The first
required the Secretary of State to negotiate with other states and
to develop treaties to protect the sea turtle. The second limited
the import of shrimp from states that do not use devices to
protect the sea turtle. The court found that the second provision
fell within the definition of embargo established by the Supreme
Court in K Mart v. Cartier, Inc.1 0

Although the purpose of the

limitation was to protect the environment rather than to affect
trade policy, the limitation constituted an embargo because it was
a governmental ban on the import of shrimp. As a result, any
lawsuit arising from an application of that provision would fall
within1 1the exclusive jurisdiction of the Court of International
Trade.
The court also refused to enforce the first statutory
provision on the grounds that it violated separation of powers
principles. The Constitution gives the President the power to2
make treaties, with the advice and consent of the Congress.1
Based on this language, the court stated that the President has
the exclusive power to negotiate treaties with other states.
Congress possesses no authority in this area. The court,
therefore, would not enforce a statute that directed the conduct of
foreign relations, a realm exclusive to the executive branch.
Plaintiffs request to enforce this section of the statute was not
justiciable in a federal court.
Dissenting in part, Judge Brunette argued that the Court
of International Trade had exclusive jurisdiction over both parts
of the plaintiffs claim and that the majority erred in splitting the
issues. A future plaintiff would have to split his claim, raising
the embargo issue before the Court of International Trade and all

10. 485 U.S. 176, 108 S.Ct. 950, 99 L.Ed. 2d 151 (1988). In K Mart, the
Supreme Court broadly interpreted the scope of the Court of International Trade's
jurisdiction. The Court found that an embargo could be imposed for purposes
other than trade. The Court of International Trade has the power to hear all
issues relating to an embargo, regardless of its purpose, as long as the embargo is

imposed by the government.
11.
12.

Pub. L. No. 96-417, 94 Stat. 1727, § 1581(1) (1980).
U.S. CONST. art. I, sec. 2, cl. 2.
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other issues before a district court. Judge Brunette would let the
Court of International Trade decide the entire matter.
Stgn!flcance: Any cause of action to enforce an embargo
must be brought before the Court of International Trade. In
addition, no federal court will enforce a statute that directs the
executive branch to negotiate treaties on a specific subject.

IV. IMMIGRATION
INS AGENTS HAVE AUTHORITY TO ACT OUTSIDE THE UNITED

STATES. United States v. Chen, 2 F.3d 330 (9th Cir. 1993).
On September 19, 1991, a federal grand jury indicted nine
defendants for activities related to the smuggling of Chinese
aliens into the United States. The indictment resulted from an

undercover investigation that the Immigration and Naturalization
Service (INS) had conducted in international waters. Defendants
moved for dismissal. The district court held that the INS did not
have the authority to carry out such an investigation more than
one hundred miles offshore and dismissed the indictment. On
appeal, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit
Held: Reversed. Authority delegated by the Attorney General
empowered the INS to act in international waters.
In July 1991, the INS received a tip that the defendants
were attempting to transport a group of Chinese aliens into the
United States. The INS investigated the tip and worked with an
informant who had chartered a boat for the defendants. The
Department of Justice Undercover Operations Review Committee
authorized the INS to include undercover agents on the crew of
the boat, knowing that the boat would be operating in
international waters. As a result of the investigation, a federal
grand jury indicted the defendants for conspiracy to smuggle
aliens into the United States. The district court dismissed the
indictment and the government appealed.
The Ninth Circuit reviewed de novo the district court's
finding that the INS was acting outside its Jurisdiction. The INS
has broad statutory authority to conduct warrantless searches
without probable cause,1 3 but these searches must take place
within one hundred air miles of the boundaries of the United
States. 14 The appellate court held that the territorial limit only
applied to INS power to conduct warranfless searches; therefore,

13.

8 U.S.C. § 1357 (Supp. 1993).

14. 8 U.S.C. § 287.1(a)(2) (1991).
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the district court could not restrict all INS power to these
boundaries.
The court noted that the Attorney General has the power
to give criminal immigration laws extraterritorial effect and that
Congress intended to grant her the power to enforce these laws
outside the United States. Thus, the Attorney General had the
power to conduct this investigation on her own. The court found'
the fact that the investigation had been conducted by the INS, to
which Congress has not expressly granted extraterritorial
enforcement powers, to be of no consequence. The court found
that the Attorney General had delegated her authority in this area
to the Commissioner of the INS, and that the INS can act
pursuant to authority granted by the Attorney General. Its
powers are not limited to those found in 8 U.S.C. § 1357.
Signfflcance: The INS can act pursuant to power delegated

by the Attorney General. Accordingly, its Investigative powers are
limited only by the limits on the Attorney General's power.

